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Abstract—Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs) produce an enormous amount of big multimedia data. Due to large size,
Multimedia Sensor Nodes (MSNs) cannot store the generated multimedia data for a long time. In this scenario, mobile sinks can be
utilized for data collection. However, due to vulnerable nature of wireless networks, there is a need for an efficient security scheme to
authenticate both the MSNs and mobile sinks. In this paper, we propose a scheme to protect the underlying WMSN during mobile
multimedia data collection. The proposed scheme is a two-layer scheme. At the first layer, the MSNs are distributed into small clusters,
where each cluster is represented by a single Cluster Head (CH). At the second layer, the CHs verify the identities of the mobile sinks,
before forwarding the multimedia data. Authentication at both these layers ensures a secure data exchange. We evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme through extensive simulation results. The simulation results prove that the proposed scheme
performs better as compared to existing state-of-the-art approaches in terms of resilience and handshake duration. The proposed
scheme is also analyzed in terms of authentication rate, data freshness, and packet delivery ratio, and has shown a better performance.
Index Terms—WMSNs, multimedia, MSNs, security, clusters, authentication.
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1 INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONAL concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) con-sists of small sensing devices that are battery-operated
and unable to perform long-range wireless communication
[1]. The sensing devices usually form a small Wireless Sen-
sor Network (WSN), and forward sensed data to a nearby
Base Station (BS). In these networks, computationally-
complex tasks are always performed at the BS. In recent
years, evolutionary steps have been taken in the field of
WSNs where audio and visual sensors are integrated into
simple sensor nodes and have transformed them into Multi-
media Sensor Nodes (MSNs). These nodes are able to store,
correlate and fuse both multimedia and non-multimedia
data [2]. The MSNs are gaining the attention of researchers
across the globe due to their wide range of applications in
daily lives, such as e-health, transport management system,
and security and surveillance. For example, in smart cities,
smart sensing cameras installed at major junctions, roads
and highways can capture current scenarios of vehicular
traffic, and forward the captured multimedia data to either
local or remote cloud servers for further processing and
analysis. Earlier generations of MSNs consist of a limited
battery power and a low-power transceiver to transmit and
receive multimedia data. However, latest generations, such
as wireless and camera motes, have powerful hardware and
are able to deal with high-resolution multimedia data. A
comparison between the earlier and latest generations of
MSNs was summarized in [3]. On a large scale, multiple
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smart sensing cameras operate simultaneously. As a result,
huge volumes of multimedia data are generated, that need
to be managed and processed efficiently in real-time.
Just like miniature sensors, the MSNs also build a net-
work known as a Wireless Multimedia Sensor Network
(WMSN). For an efficient data sharing and transmission,
the WSNs/WMSNs are usually distributed into small clus-
ters. Each cluster is represented by a nominated node,
known as a Cluster Head (CH). The nominated CHs take
responsibility for collecting the sensed/captured data from
the member nodes and forwarding to the BS. Depending
upon the underlying application, the captured data may
contain sensitive information. Furthermore, there is usually
no human intervention when the WMSNs are deployed in
an open environment. Such deployments expose these net-
works to various network vulnerabilities and threats, such
as node replication, Sybil attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS),
and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [4]. These attacks are
usually launched by malicious nodes. Therefore, there is
a need to protect these networks from vulnerabilities and
threats through robust and highly efficient node authentica-
tion schemes.
For the MWSNs operating in open environments, a mo-
bile sink can play an important role to collect and forward
data to the local/cloud servers. The mobile sinks can be
mobile sensors, smartphones or personal digital assistants,
and are able to communicate with the nearby sensor nodes
[5]. Therefore, the mobile sinks are an essential component
in large-scale WMSNs. Sometimes, it is possible that the
link between cloud/local servers and BS may be partially
or completely damaged. As a result, the BS is able to
control the network but unable to upload the collected data
to the servers. On the other hand, the CHs continuously
collect and forward the multimedia data to the BS. This
data need to be offloaded by the BS due to the fact that
2the BS might not have enough storage space to store the
forwarded real-time multimedia data for a long time. One
solution to this problem is the use of mobile sinks. In this
case, the CHs will forward the collected data to the mobile
sinks, instead of forwarding to the BS. After receiving the
data from CHs, the mobile sinks will forward the data to
the local/cloud servers, as soon as they get access to the
Internet. However, the use of mobile sinks to collect the data
from the WMSNs introduces a new security challenge in the
form of network control and attack. Privileges assigned to
the mobile sinks can be compromised, and as a result, can be
misused. Without a proper authorization, the compromised
mobile sinks can control the entire network and may cause
undesirable consequences. Therefore, there is a need for a
proper security mechanism to authenticate the validity of
mobile sinks and detect any compromised mobile sinks.
In this paper, we propose a secure multimedia data
collection scheme through mobile sinks in the WMSNs. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no existing solution
for a secure mobile data collection in the WMSNs. The
proposed approach is based on a two-layer architecture.
These two layers help in securely managing the captured
multimedia data. At the first layer, the identities of the
participating devices, i.e., the CHs and MSNs, are verified
through a lightweight four-way handshaking mechanism.
At the second layer, the CHs forward the received data to
the authorized mobile sinks. The major contributions are as
follows.
• A lightweight four-way handshaking mechanism is
applied to verify the identities of participating de-
vices (i.e., the CHs and MSNs). It is a payload-
based mutual authentication mechanism. During the
authentication process, the payload is always en-
crypted, and the authentication mechanism incurs
minimal computational overhead.
• A lightweight authentication scheme is applied to
verify the identities of mobile sinks. This scheme
is similar to the four-way handshaking mechanism.
However, due to the mobility of sinks, hashing func-
tions along with random numbers have been utilized
to verify the identities of the mobile sinks. This
authentication is first performed between the mobile
sinks and BS, and then between the mobile sinks and
CHs.
• The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed
in terms of various performance metrics. The simu-
lation results prove the efficiency of our proposed
scheme as compared to other well-known state-of-
the-art approaches.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A liter-
ature review on the recent work is provided in Section II.
The system model is described in Section III followed by
an explanation of the proposed approach in Section IV. The
experimental setup and simulation results are discussed in
Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
We distribute this section into two subsections. In the
first subsection, we discuss various node authentication
schemes, proposed for the cluster-based WSNs/WMSNs. In
the second subsections, we provide an overview of various
authentication schemes for mobile sinks.
2.1 Node Authentication
In [6], various user authentication schemes designed for
WSNs were reviewed. In this survey, the WSNs in unat-
tended environments are targeted, and secure and depend-
able user authentication mechanisms are analyzed for future
research proposals, challenges, and applications. In [7], a
study on an adaptive security design for malicious node de-
tection in the cluster-based sensor networks was presented.
In this study, the adaptive security modules are analyzed
to improve the secure communication in the cluster-based
WSNs by protecting them from external malicious nodes,
using the authentication schemes.
In [8], a cluster-based node authentication scheme was
proposed for the WMSNs. In this scheme, the clusters are
formed through a lightweight mutual authentication mech-
anism between the MSNs and CHs. In [9], a geographic
secured routing mechanism was used to authenticate nodes
and messages in the WMSNs. In this mechanism, the Secure
Hash Algorithm v3 (SHA-3) is used to minimize computa-
tional complexity for the authentication purposes. In [10],
a user-friendly hybrid authentication scheme was proposed
for the WSNs. In this scheme, mutual authentication and
key agreement schemes are combined, using chaotic maps
to minimize the computational complexity and protect user
anonymity and secret passwords. In [11], a compressive
sensing based approach for a secure data collection in the
WSNs was proposed. In this approach, asymmetric semi-
homomorphic encryption is used to ensure the privacy
during the data collection, and sparse compressive matrix
is used to reduce the computational costs.
2.2 Mobile Sink Authentication
In [12], an authentication scheme was proposed to detect
the mobile sink replication attacks in unattended sensor
networks. This scheme is based on a model where a mobile
sink can collect data from a sensor node, only if it establishes
a shared key with the sensor node, and passes through
authentication of at least m neighbors to improve the un-
derlying network’s resilience against the replication attacks.
In [13], [14], a seamless key agreement framework was
proposed for the mobile sinks in an IoT-based cloud-centric
secured sensor network. In this framework, a seamless se-
cured authentication and key agreement approach, using bi-
linear pairing and elliptic-curve crypto-systems, is adopted
to prevent node-capture attacks and support data confiden-
tiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user
anonymity, password guessing, and key impersonation. In
[15], a comprehensive approach for data collection was
proposed for sensor-cloud systems. In this approach, the
trustworthiness of mobile sinks and sensor nodes are eval-
uated against various type of trusts. In [16], pairing-free ID-
based identification scheme was proposed to minimize com-
putation and communication costs for registering mobile
sinks in WSNs. In this scheme, the performance is evaluated
in terms of computation cost and energy consumption on
well-known WSN hardware platforms. In [17], distributed
3and decentralized schemes were proposed to detect repli-
cation attacks in mobile WSNs. In these schemes, malicious
nodes along with collaborating imposters are detected and
quarantined through total number of false-positives. In [18],
a lightweight algorithm was proposed to detect mobile Sybil
nodes in the mobile WSNs. In this algorithm, Watchdog
Nodes first technique is used to label mobile nodes, based
on their movements. As a result, the Sybil nodes can be
detected with a high accuracy, according to their movements
and the assigned labels.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
The system model focuses on multimedia data collection
from the secured WMSNs. The MSNs capture/sense un-
usual events, and store the captured/sensed in their buffers.
Later, the captured/sensed data are forwarded to the elected
CHs. These CHs are responsible for sharing the received
data with the nearby mobile sinks. The mobile sinks are
then responsible to upload the data to the cloud/local
servers through the Internet. As the focus is on the secure
collection of multimedia data, therefore, the computational
overhead of securing the underlying network needs to be
the minimum.
3.1 Secure Cluster Formation Model
The secure cluster formation model is based on our pre-
vious work, published in [19], [20]. Notations used in our
proposed model are illustrated in Table 1. In this model,
the MSNs are denoted by αs, the CHs are denoted by
rs, and the BS is denoted by a γ. Identity verification
messages are exchanged between αs and rs. The identity
verification messages contain various challenges that need
to be decrypted by communicating entities. In our proposed
scheme, the authentication process consists of four phases,
i.e., session initiation, CH challenge, MSN response and
challenge, and CH response. To encrypt the payload of the
verification messages, Advanced Encryption Standard 128-
bits (AES-128) is used. Each MSN possesses a pre-shared
secret (i.e., λ) and a token (i.e., τ ). The secret is used
during the authentication process, and the token is used
for a secure exchange of nomination and acknowledgment
packets between the CHs and BS.
Notation Description
α Mobile sensor node (MSN)
r CH (CH)
γ Base station
λ Secret
τ Token
i ID of mobile sensor node
j ID of CH
η Pseudo-random nonce
µ Session key
ϑ Intermediate value
C Challenge
TABLE 1: Notations of cluster formation model
During the first phase, i.e., the session initiation, each
MSN creates a joining-request message and forwards it
to a targeted CH. The payload of each joining-request
message contains the ID of the MSN (i.e., αi), where
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., I}, and the header contains the ID of the
targeted CH (i.e., rj), where j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., J}).
After the session initiation, next phase is the CH chal-
lenge. In this phase, the rj searches for a matching λi for the
αi, and replies back with a challenge. The challenge consists
of a pseudo-random nonce (i.e., ηr), and a session key (i.e.,
µ) generated by an rj . The challenge is created using the
following equations.
ϑ = λi ⊕ µ, (1)
Cr = AES{λi, (ϑ | ηr)}, (2)
where ϑ is an intermediate value generated by an rj , and
Cr is the challenge created for an αi.
In the MSN response phase, the αi retrieves ηr and µ
from Cr, and creates a challenge of its own, for an rj , using
the following equations.
ϑ = ηr ⊕ λi, (3)
Ci = AES{µ, (ϑ | ηi)}, (4)
where ηi is the pseudo-random nonce, ϑ is the intermediate
value generated by an αi, and Ci is the challenge created for
an rj .
Upon reception, the rj tries to retrieve ηr from αi’s chal-
lenge. If present, the status of αi changes to Authenticated,
and the rj replies back with a response to αi’s challenge
to complete the authentication process using the following
equation.
Cr = AES{λi, (ηi | µ)}. (5)
Upon receiving the response computed by Eq. 5, the αi
tries to extract the ηi. If present, the status of rj changes to
Authenticated.
3.2 Mobile Sink Verification Model
The notations used in this model are illustrated in Table
2. The mobile sinks (i.e., βs) communicate with CHs to
collect the captured data. However, each mobile sink first
needs to register itself with the BS. Once registered, the
mobile sinks are able to communicate with the surrounding
CHs. Before contacting the BS for registration, each mobile
sink generates a session key (i.e., µk), where k is the ID of
the requesting mobile sink, and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...,K}, and a
random integer x, where x ∈ Z . In this registration process,
two hashing functions, i.e., H1 and H2, are utilized. Each βk
generates a secure request message (i.e., Θk) for registration
using H2, as illustrated by the following equation.
Θk = AES{k, (H2(x⊕ µk))}. (6)
The generated request is forwarded to the BS. After
receiving the request message, the BS generates an en-
crypted challenge (i.e., Cγ) consisting of four values using
the following equations and forwards it to the βk.
4Notation Description
β Mobile sink
k ID of mobile sink
w, x, y, z Random integers
Z Set of integers
H1, H2 Hashing functions
Θ Secure request message
∆ Registration certificate
δ Time-stamp
Ψ Authentication value
µ New session key
f Bilinear group mapping function
cˆ Available capacity of mobile sink
t time
d Communication range of mobile sink
v Moving speed of mobile sink
s Service rate of mobile sink
TABLE 2: Notations of mobile sink verification model
∆k = w.H1(k || H2(x⊕ µk)), (7a)
δk = H2(H2(k || y)), (7b)
Ψk = H2(k || x || y), (7c)
Cγ = AES{∆k, δk,Ψk}, (7d)
where w ∈ Z , y ∈ Z , ∆k is a registration certificate, δk is a
time-stamp, and Ψk is an authentication value for the βk.
Upon reception, each βk creates an encrypted response
(i.e., Ck) using a random value z, where z ∈ Z , and
replies back to complete the registration process by using
the following equations.
ak = H2(Ψk || H2(x⊕ µk) || z), (8a)
Ck = AES{ak, z}. (8b)
Upon receiving the response, the BS verifies identity
of the βk using Eq. 8a. If the equation holds, then the
βk is considered an authentic node. The βk generates an
encrypted connection request (i.e., Ck) including a new
session key (i.e., µk) by using the following equations and
forwards it to the authentic rj .
bk = f(∆k.H2(δk).H1(j)), (9a)
µk = f(H2(δk).∆k, H2(δk).H1(j)), (9b)
Ck = AES{bk, µk}, (9c)
where f() is a bilinear group mapping function.
Upon reception, the rj verifies the identity of βk by
using Eq. 9a. If the equation holds, the βk is considered
an authentic node. Once authenticated, the rj can start
communicating with βk using µk.
Each βk has a specific capacity, and cannot collect mul-
timedia data from all the nearby rs. It is possible that a βk
is communicating with more than one r. In this situation,
it needs to assign a specific capacity to an rj . The available
capacity (i.e., cˆ) of a βk at time t is estimated by the following
equations.
t =
d
v
, (10)
cˆ = s× t, (11)
where, d is communication range, v is moving speed, and s
is service rate of a βk.
4 SECURED AND AUTHORIZED DATA COLLECTION
SCHEME
In this section, we explain our proposed Secured and autho-
rized Scheme (SaaS) for mobile multimedia data collection.
The block diagram depicting the traditional mechanism of
the WMSNs is shown in Fig. 1. The block diagram depicting
the operational mechanism of the proposed SaaS is shown
in Fig. 2. The proposed SaaS is divided into two layers, i.e.,
the device and mobile sink layers. The clusters are formed at
the device layer via a lightweight handshaking mechanism,
while the data is collected from the CHs using the mobile
sinks at the mobile sink layer.
4.1 Secure Cluster Formation
This phase is divided into two sub-phases, i.e., the election
of the CHs, and mutual authentication between the MSNs
and CHs. The CH election is a token-based approach which
enables the MSNs with highest energy levels to become the
CHs. The remaining nodes join the CHs to form clusters and
forward data to the elected CHs.
4.1.1 CH Election
In our proposed SaaS, the WMSN consists of 500 ran-
domly deployed MSNs. The MSNs with minimum energy
levels become members in a cluster while the remaining
nodes become the CHs. The elected CHs are responsible
for authentication of member nodes, and data reception and
forwarding to the BS. Each MSN possesses a λ and a τ . The τ
is used to exchange control packets i.e., nomination packets
(i.e., p), and acknowledgment packets (i.e., ACK), between
the CHs and BS. On the other hand, the λ is used to perform
mutual authentication inside the clusters between the MSNs
and CHs.
At the beginning of each round, each αi broadcasts a pi
to the BS. Each pi contains the α’s ID (i.e., i), secret (i.e.,
λi), and residual energy (i.e., αe). Upon reception, the BS
extracts i and αe from p, and computes the average energy
threshold (i.e., E), by using the following equation.
E =
N∑
i=1
αe
N
, (12)
where N represents the total number of MSNs.
An αi having energy equal or greater than E is consid-
ered eligible to be elected as a CH. An exception may occur
at the start of each round when all the MSNs have almost
the same energy levels. In this case, the election of a CH is
based on minor differences in the energy values and can go
up to four decimal digits. In upcoming simulation rounds,
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6it is possible to have more than one nominee for a CH role.
In this case, a CH is selected based on the following rules.
• αe should be equal or greater than E.
• Node αi is not elected as a CH in past rounds.
• Nominees in the same geographical location are eval-
uated based on their previous history of election if
they have the same energy levels.
After the election, the BS broadcasts a pγ to the elected
CHs. This pγ contains the IDs of the elected CHs and their
neighboring MSNs. 16-bit tokens similar to the tokens of the
elected CHs are also appended in the header of each pγ .
Upon reception, an elected rj matches the received token
with its own. If matches, three operations are performed
at the elected rj , 1) retrieval of the appended IDs of the
neighboring MSNs and storing in an array (i.e., B[αi][λi]),
2) creation of an ACK packet that includes its own token
and forwards it back to the BS, and 3) advertising itself to
its neighboring MSNs. It is possible that an MSN receives
advertisements from more than one CH. In this case, an
MSN associates itself with the nearest one by sending a
joining request. The location of an MSN with respect to a
broadcasting rj is computed by the Euclidean distance (i.e.,
dˆ), as shown in the following equation.
dˆ =
√
(x− xi)2 − (y − yi)2. (13)
The joining process requires mutual authentication
which is explained in the next subsection.
4.1.2 Mutual Authentication
Upon successful advertisement, each MSN tries to become
a part/member of a cluster, led by a CH. The aim of cluster
formation is to secure data transmission from the MSNs to
the CHs that are authorized to share the data with either
the BS or mobile sinks. To authenticate an MSN, a payload-
based handshaking mechanism is used. The 128-bit AES
encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the messages shared
between the nodes. Unlike AES-192 and AES-256 algo-
rithms, the AES-128 algorithm requires less computational
resources and is suitable for real-time data processing [21].
The MSNs exchange multiple handshake messages with the
CHs as shown in Fig. 3. Once authenticated, an MSN is
allowed to forward the data to the nearest CH, to whom
it belongs.
In the session initiation phase, an MSN sends a join-
request to the nearest CH. The join request contains j, i and
λi. The IDs are 8-bits long, making the join request messages
extremely lightweight. A maximum of four join requests can
be sent to a CH. After four attempts, any further attempt is
simply ignored. In the join-request, an i is encapsulated in
the payload while a j is encapsulated in the header. A frame
check sequence is also appended as a trailer of the payload
for error detection and correction.
Upon receiving the join-request, the CH retrieves j and i
from the header and payload fields, respectively. If the CH’s
ID does not match with rj , the request is simply discarded
otherwise the CH proceeds with the CH challenge task. The
CH also searches for a matching λi. If a match is found, the
requesting device is considered authentic, and a challenge is
Cluster 
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Fig. 3: Secured Cluster Formation via Handshaking
forwarded back as a response. The challenge consists of an
encrypted payload and is computed by Eq. 1-2.
In the MSN response phase, the MSN needs to decipher
the encrypted payload to extract µ and ηr. Upon successful
deciphering, the MSN is authenticated and able to create a
challenge, using Eq. 3-4, to verify the identity of the CH.
Upon receiving the MSN’s challenge, the CH deciphers
the challenge to observe an ηr . If present, it retrieves an
ηi, and creates a 256-bit encrypted payload, using Eq. 5, to
transmit as a response to MSN’s challenge and changes the
status of MSN to Authenticated.
After receiving the CH’s response, the MSN verifies
the identity of an rj . Upon successful verification, the
mutual authentication process is completed, and the MSN
is now permitted to forward the data to the selected rj .
Furthermore, the selected rj is now authorized to share
the data collected with the mobile sinks. The entire mutual
authentication process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
4.2 Mobile Sink Verification
In the cluster-based data communication, the CHs collect
the data from member MSNs, and forward to the BS. In
our proposed SaaS, we are assuming that the Internet con-
nection is down, and the BS is unable to forward the data
to the local/cloud servers. In this particular scenario, the
mobile sinks can collect the data from the CHs, and forward
to the local/cloud servers. However, the use of mobile
sinks raises network security issues. To ensure a secure
data communication from the CHs to mobile sinks, there
is a need to authenticate the mobile sinks. In the following
subsections, we explain registration and authentication of
the mobile sinks in a WMSN.
4.2.1 Mobile Sink Registration
For a secure data exchange between the CHs and mobile
sinks, there is a need to register the mobile sinks with the BS
as shown in Fig. 4. In real-world scenarios, the mobile sinks
are always on the move. As a result, the CHs get a very
7Algorithm 1 Payload-based Mutual Authentication
1: Initialization:
• α←− [i, λi]
• r ←− [j, λj ]
• Input [λi=λj=2128]
2: (αi, λi, rj)→ rj
3: if rj == rj then
4: if [αi,λj]==A[αi][λi] then
5: αi ←→ rj . Session created between αi and rj
6: rj → αi : {Cr, challenge created}
7: else
8: αi is unauthorized
9: end if
10: else
11: The request is for a different r and discarded
12: end if
13: αi ←− {λi, (ϑ | ηr)} . Decipher challenge
14: αi → rj : {Ci, αi respond with a challenge}
15: if ηr exists then
16: Access granted
17: αi is authenticated
18: rj → αi : {Cr, rj responds back with a new chal-
lenge}
19: else
20: Access denied
21: αi is unauthenticated
22: end if
23: if ηi exists then
24: rj is authenticated
25: Data can be exchanged now
26: else
27: rj is unauthenticated
28: end if
short amount of time to share the data with the authorized
mobile sinks. In the proposed SaaS, each βk generates an µk,
and some random integers, i.e., x and z. The generated µk
and random integers are used to register a βk with the BS,
and these numbers need to be generated before forwarding
a registration request. The registration process is based on
two hashing functions, i.e., H1 and H2, for mapping and
secure hashing purposes, respectively [22]. The first hashing
function, i.e., H1, is used to perform a map to point hashing
operation, and the second hashing function, i.e., H2, is
used to perform one-way secure hashing. For both hashing
operations, the range of values is between {0, 1}.
After generating the random integers and µk, the first
step in the registration process is to generate and send an
encrypted registration request, i.e., Θk, to the BS. This reg-
istration request consists of k, µk, and one of the generated
random integers, i.e., x. The registration request is generated
using Eq. 6.
After receiving the encrypted registration request, the
BS decrypts it and extracts all the embedded values. The
BS also generates two random integer values, i.e., w and y.
The BS uses the extracted values to generate an encrypted
challenge. The encrypted challenge consists of three differ-
ent values, i.e., a registration certificate (i.e., ∆k), a time-
stamp (i.e., δk), and an authentication value (i.e., Ψk). The BS
Registration Request
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Fig. 4: Registration of Mobile Sink with Base Station
generates two copies of the registration certificate. One copy
of the registration certificate is stored at the BS for future
communication, and the other copy is used in the encrypted
challenge. The time-stamp represents the total amount of
time a mobile sink can spend in the WMSN to collect the
data from the CHs. The authentication value is used to
create a response to the encrypted challenge at the mobile
sink. The three different values for the encrypted challenge
are computed using Eq. 7a-7c. After computing these values,
the BS embeds them into an encrypted payload, and sends
as a challenge to the requesting βk, using Eq. 7d.
After receiving the encrypted challenge, the requesting
βk decrypts the payload to extract the embedded values.
The registration certificate and time-stamp are stored at
the mobile sink, and the authentication value is used to
create a response to the BS’s challenge. The mobile sink
uses the random integer values x and z along with the
extracted authentication value and session key to create an
intermediate value using Eq. 8a. The generated intermediate
value along with the random integer value z is encrypted in
the payload of the message, using Eq. 8b, and is sent to the
BS as a response to the challenge.
After receiving the encrypted response, the BS verifies
the identity of the mobile sink, using Eq. 8a. If the equation
holds, the mobile sink is considered authentic, otherwise, it
is considered an intruder node. After verifying the identity
of the mobile sink, the BS performs three operations, 1)
shares the registration certificate and time-stamp of the ver-
ified mobile sink with all the CHs, 2) forwards the database
of elected CHs to the verified mobile sinks, and 3) forwards
the location information of the nearby CHs to the verified
mobile sinks to complete the registration process.
84.2.2 Mobile Sink Authentication
After receiving the database of all the elected CHs, the
mobile sink stores the database in its buffer. Secondly, it
broadcasts a request to all the nearby CHs for establishing
a connection to collect the data. In response, the nearby
CHs reply back by sharing their unique IDs, i.e., j. If the
IDs exist in the stored database, the mobile sink generates
two intermediate values using the IDs of the CHs and its
own time-stamp, as shown in Eq. 9a-9b. These generated
intermediate values are encapsulated into the payload of a
connection request message, as shown in Eq. 9c, and sent to
the CHs. Upon receiving, the CHs verify the identity of the
mobile sink, using Eq. 9a. If the equation holds, the mobile
sink is considered an authentic node. Once the mobile sink
is authenticated, the CHs start communication with it.
It is possible that the mobile sink is connected to more
than one CH at a time. In this case, it broadcasts a data
collection request to all the communicating/connected CHs.
The data is arranged in their buffers, based on priority
levels. Due to the large size, the multimedia data is always
of high priority, and need to be transmitted first. The data
collection requests provide information about the size of
data. Based on the provided information, the mobile sink
assigns capacities to the CHs.
Once the mobile sink broadcasts a request for a data
collection, the nearby CHs reply back with capacity allo-
cation requests, based on their low and high priority data.
The mobile sink first processes high priority data requests
and assigns high capacities to the requesting CHs. Once the
capacity is assigned, the CHs immediately start transmitting
the data. If there is any capacity left at the mobile sink, it is
evenly assigned to the CHs with low priority data requests.
The capacity allocation process is a continuous process
and stops when no more capacity is left. Furthermore, the
capacity of the mobile sink is always updated according
to its moving speed. The current available capacity of the
mobile sink at time t is estimated by using Eq. 10-11. It is
possible that there are multiple mobile sinks moving around
a CH. In this case, a mobile sink is selected based on the
maximum available capacity. The mobile sink registration,
authentication, and data exchange processes are summa-
rized in Algorithm 2.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND SIMULATION RE-
SULTS
In this section, first, we discuss experimental setup. Later,
the performance of our proposed SaaS is evaluated in detail.
5.1 Network Setup
For simulations, we use Matlab 2017a. The network consists
of 500 randomly deployed MSNs, out of which 5% of the
nodes are selected as the CHs. All the nodes are deployed
in a 500×500m2 area. The mobile sinks and MSNs commu-
nicate over an IEEE 802.11e network. The communication
range of each MSN is set to 100m. The mobile sinks are
always on the move with a speed of v using random way-
point mobility model [23]. We do not consider any pause
time in their movements.
Algorithm 2 Mobile Sink Verification
1: Initialization:
• β ←− k
• . where k represents number of βs in the
network
• β ←− [µ, x, z]
• γ ←− [w, y]
2: βk → γ : {Θk, secured request message}
3: γ → βk : {Cγ , encrypted challenge}
4: βk → γ : {Ck, encrypted response}
5: if Ψk exists then
6: . γ checks for the presence of Ψk in Ck
7: βk is registered
8: γ → rs : {∆k and δk, these values are shared with
rs}
9: γ → βk : {rs, share database and locations of rs with
βk}
10: else
11: βk is unregistered
12: end if
13: if j exists then
14: Send a connection request
15: else
16: rj is unauthenticated
17: end if
18: if k exists then
19: βk is authorized
20: βk → r : {cˆ, assigning available capacity to r}
21: if Pr[a] > Pr[b] then
22: βk assigns cˆ to r[a] . ∀ a, b ∈ j
. P represents priority-level
23: βk ←− r[a] : {D, r[a] start transmitting high-
priority multimedia data D}
24: else
25: βk assigns cˆ to r[b]
26: end if
27: else
28: βk is unauthenticated
29: end if
5.2 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of our
proposed SaaS approach against two similar state-of-the-art
schemes, i.e., Secured Query Processing Scheme (SQPS) [24],
and Modified Secured Query Processing Scheme (MSQPS)
[25]. Both these schemes use a cluster-based hierarchical ap-
proach for securing the exchange of data. First, we compare
the proposed SaaS against the SQPS and MSQPS in terms
of various security primitives followed by their robustness
against various attacks, handshake duration, authentication
rate, data freshness, and packet delivery ratio, respectively.
In the proposed SaaS, the node authentication phase is
a two-step process. First, the CHs are elected by the BS.
Later, a mutual handshaking mechanism is performed to
authenticate both the CHs and MSNs for data collection.
The proposed SaaS uses a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode to ensure
the authentication, as shown in Table 3. The SQPS and
9MSQPS, on the other hand, use the simple MAC for au-
thentication. To ensure confidentiality, the proposed SaaS
uses a payload-based symmetric encryption, that is ex-
tremely lightweight. In comparison, the SQPS and MSQPS
employ RC5-based symmetric cryptography to maintain the
confidentiality. For data freshness, the proposed SaaS uses
pseudo-random nonces (i.e., ηi and ηr). These nonces have
a one-time usage during the handshake mechanism and are
non-reproducible. This feature of these nonces ensures that
redundant packets are not replayed by malicious nodes,
and the freshness of genuine data packets remain intact.
The SQPS and MSQPS use Query Response (QR) packets
to ensure the data freshness. In this case, each member node
of a cluster transmits a 4-tuple packet to its respective CH.
Each QR packet ensures the freshness at the expense of a
high computational cost at the CH.
TABLE 3: Security Analysis
Security Services SQPS MSQPS SaaS
Authentication MAC MAC CBC
Confidentiality Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric
Freshness QR QR Nonces
We evaluate the resilience of the three schemes against
various malicious attacks as shown in Table 4. In the pro-
posed SaaS, the presence of ηi, ηr and λi, protects the
underlying network from different types of malicious at-
tacks. Random combinations of ηi and ηj in the proposed
SaaS make it extremely difficult for an adversary to replay
packets. The SQPS and MSQPS use QR packets to prevent
the replay of malicious packets. In the proposed SaaS, the
use of λi restricts any unauthorized node from establishing
connections with the CHs. As a result, it is extremely diffi-
cult for the malicious nodes to launch resource exhaustion
and DoS attacks. As λi is a hard-coded secret, any attempt
for tempering can easily be identified, and an alarm can be
triggered. This feature of λi ensures that a malicious node
does not clone itself by stealing the identity of a legitimate
node. The BS has prior knowledge about the identities of
all the legitimate nodes that prevent the malicious nodes
from launching the Sybil attacks, as they are unable to
impersonate themselves. The SQPS and MSQPS, on the
other hand, are unable to detect the resource exhaustion,
DoS, cloning and Sybil attacks.
TABLE 4: Resilience against Attacks
Attacks SQPS MSQPS SaaS
Replay Yes Yes Yes
Resource Exhaustion No No Yes
Denial-of-Service No No Yes
Cloning No No Yes
Sybil No No Yes
We evaluate the performance of the proposed SaaS
against the SQPS and MSQPS in term of handshake duration
for various cluster sizes as shown in Table 5. The handshake
duration depends on the total number of member nodes
in a cluster and is usually measured in milliseconds (ms).
The handshake approach of the proposed SaaS takes less
time as compared to the SQPS and MSQPS. Unlike these
approaches, the CHs in our proposed SaaS use local knowl-
edge of neighboring nodes for handshaking and authenti-
cation purposes. As the table shows, increasing the size of
a cluster has a relatively smaller impact on the handshake
duration in the proposed SaaS. However, the handshake
duration increases significantly in the case of the SQPS and
MSQPS with an increase in the cluster size. This is mainly
due to the fact that these schemes use complex symmetric
encryption suites that require excessive processing at each
CH.
TABLE 5: Handshake Duration (ms)
Cluster Size SQPS MSQPS SaaS
15 4.03 3.7 2.08
20 4.99 4.1 2.16
25 5.31 4.33 2.37
40 7.11 5.91 2.99
In Fig. 5, the authentication rate for received messages
is shown. As the figure shows, the authentication rate de-
creases with an increase in the number of malicious nodes
in the underlying network. This is mainly because the CHs
have to process requests from multiple sensor nodes (MSNs
in the case of the proposed SaaS) at a given time, which
allows one or more malicious nodes to sneak through the
underlying authentication mechanism. Another reason for
this decrease in the authentication rate is as the number
of malicious nodes increases, the number of attempts by
these nodes to transmit their unauthenticated information
increases. In Fig. 5(a), we compare the proposed SaaS
against the MSQPS and SQPS in the presence of 25 malicious
nodes. Although our proposed SaaS scheme drops slightly
for the first 10 seconds, it sustains itself by ensuring a higher
authentication rate. Minimum authentication rate is 98.5%
that shows that the proposed SaaS is highly robust against
the detection of malicious nodes. In comparison, as the time
passes, the authentication rates of MSQPS and SQPS drop
to 96.28% and 93.85%, respectively. In the presence of 50
malicious nodes, the proposed SaaS has a minimum authen-
tication rate of 93.1%, as shown in Fig. 5(b). In comparison,
the authentication rates of MSQPS and SQPS drop to as low
as 87.8% and 81.2%, respectively. Fig 5 concludes that the
proposed SaaS is highly efficient in ensuring the message
integrity in comparison to the MSQPS and SQPS because
the authentication rate is an indicator of message integrity.
In Fig. 6, the proposed SaaS is compared with the MSQPS
and SQPS in term of data freshness. A higher percentage
of data freshness means a scheme is more resilient against
the replay attacks. In the presence of 25 malicious nodes,
the average data freshness of the proposed SaaS is 99.45%,
MSQPS is 97.28% and SQPS is 91.8%, respectively, over a
period of 120 seconds. These results are depicted in Fig.
6(a). The proposed SaaS achieves a higher percentage of
data freshness and sustains itself against the replay attacks
over the course of time. Unlike the proposed SaaS, the
MSQPS experiences a significant decrease after 30 seconds
of the network deployment. The SQPS, on the other hand,
experiences a significant drop of 11% in the data freshness,
after the initial 20 seconds of the network deployment. In
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Fig. 5: Authentication rate for varying number of malicious
nodes
Fig. 6(b), all the three schemes are compared in term of data
freshness in the presence of 50 malicious nodes. The average
data freshness of the proposed SaaS is 99.3%, MSQPS is
94.9% and SQPS is 90.3%, respectively, over the course of
time. In the beginning, the proposed SaaS drops briefly
beyond the MSQPS, however, the drop is only 1.1% for a
short period of 10 seconds. After 30 seconds, the MSQPS
drops to as low as 91% and stays low over the specified
period of time. The SQPS, on the other hand, drops by 15%
after the initial 20 seconds and stays low over the course of
time. Fig 6 concludes that as the number of malicious nodes
increases, the freshness percentage of the received data
decreases. An increase in the number of malicious nodes
increases the number of attempts made by such nodes to
transmit their data packets. As a result, the redundant data
packets are transmitted which affects the freshness metric
and at the same time, increases the replay attacks.
In Fig 7, packet delivery ratio of the three schemes is
shown for varying number of malicious nodes. The average
packet delivery ratio for SaaS is 95%, MSQPS is 84% and
SQPS is 74%, respectively. Unlike SaaS, MSQPS and SQPS
experience a significant drop in packet delivery ratio with an
increase in the number of malicious nodes. This parameter
is associated with authentication rate, in general. During
the authentication, the malicious nodes that go undetected,
acquire time division multiple access (TDMA) slots from
cluster heads and broadcast their fake data packets. Both
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MSQPS and SPQS experience a significant drop in packet
delivery ratio as the number of malicious nodes increases
from 20 to 100, respectively.
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6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a node authentication
scheme, called SaaS. It has been designed for multimedia
data collection through mobile sinks in a wireless multi-
media sensor network. The proposed SaaS has based on
the clustering concept. A mutual handshaking mechanism
has been applied to authenticate both the MSNs and CHs.
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Once authenticated, the MSNs forward the captured data
to the elected CHs, and then it is the responsibility of the
CHs to share the collected data with the nearby verified
mobile sinks. The mobile sink verification involves their
registration with the base station and authentication with
the CHs. The simulation results have shown that our pro-
posed SaaS performs better in terms of resilience, handshake
duration, authentication rate, data freshness, and packet
delivery ratio when compared with other established state-
of-the-art approaches. Regarding future work, we shall use
the simulation results produced in this paper as a base to
perform further enhancements in our proposed SaaS to sup-
port mobile MSNs and sinks with random speeds. Besides,
we aim to implement the proposed scheme on real testbeds
in open field environment to measure various phenomena
of interests in order to analyze various QoS metrics.
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